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A COMMENT ON THE MILLER-SASTRI ARTICLE
WALTER PROBERT*
O dds are high that the call for judicial deliberation in the sunshine
will not be well received in the legal profession generally.
Even so, it deserves serious attention. Some may put it down as naive
or lacking in depth, but it is daring and innovative, down to the guts
of the crucial issue of judicial credibility. It points to a fruitful frontier
for both political and scientific inquiry and debate. Of course, the
political goals and the scientific worth which have been intertwined
in the proposal are of different looms.
If courts are government, and the Supreme Court merely another
basically political body, then open deliberation and full disclosure
of influences follow from the public's right to know and participate.
Naturally, the judicial animal can be expected to resist. The sun can
burn, especially naked power. More subtle would be the impact on
the internal dynamics of a court. In the terms of small group theory,
a public dyad is not really just a dyad. In any event, lifting the veil
involves the taking and redistribution of power.
Of a different piece is the justification in the name of science:
the advancement of knowledge. Even with optimum conditions, sci-
ence is hard put to assess decisional dynamics. Presently we can only
see the black box and what comes out of it, with a limited view of in-
put. Judicial opinions do not suffice as a source for significant data for
the making of valid correlations. No doubt opening of the black box
would help, yet one remembers the bugging of the jury room and the
great outcry. There seem to be other values at stake than the right or
need to know.
As unapparent as it is, there is a way that the political question
relates to the scientific. Maybe rhetorical ploy-or worse, jurispruden-
tial metaphysics-is involved in saying a court is political rather than
legal. Ideological reflections lack scientific credibility, be they those
of an author or a researcher, unless given as admitted bias rather than
fact description. (A fictional Nixonian sociologist might have trouble
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with the sunlight proposal.) Yet we can be objective in observing
someone else's ideology or values, or an apparent conflict in values
between persons or groups. There could be an objective basis for saying
that a court is not behaving "legally" if it is in some way violating
cultural expectations. Behind this conclusion are dynamics which
have been subjected to a scientific sort of scrutiny which calls for in-
quiry preliminary to the grand opening of the judicial chamber doors.
Prevailing images of law-some measurement of beliefs, expectations,
and attitudes about law and the function or appropriate behavior of
the court (s) to be observed-should somehow appear in the picture.
According to some expectations, there is no need for public de-
liberation. If the law is in the Constitution, for instance, then the
measure of judicial propriety is in that recipe. It is currently popular
for some sophisticated critics to postulate the Constitution as the
funnel for social principles which are to be made legal by distinctive
but knowable rational techniques, again with no need for lifting the
veil of secrecy. In short, whatever is expected of a court has much to
do with whether it is acting or appearing to act legally; and that in
turn has everything to do with what seems likely at the moment to be
a lack of any felt need for public deliberations.
Political realists and scientists alike see "myth" operating in
such views, but myth cannot be ignored if it is a real social phe-
nomenon. Naturally there is frustration because of the manipulators
hiding behind the myth, whether judges or others using legalistic
arguments to promote unarticulated values. If cultural myths even-
tually fade to legend, they still resist debunking. As to law, there may
be risk to the debunking, risk that one is aiming his shot at social
acceptance, the heart of law. Of course, science has taken that risk
many times, perhaps on the pragmatic assumption that even socially
necessary myths eventually evolve to assimilate the discoveries of sci-
ence which slowly but eventually filter into public consciousness.
Then too, it is not as if this call for an end to judicial secrecy
is completely radical. An earlier call has had a significant impact on
legal education, lawyer practices, and even the rhetoric of judicial
opinions. But even before the advent of our most recent presidential
jurisprudence, it had not significantly affected the general public lore
of law. The reference is to that complex of scholarship known as socio-
logical jurisprudence and legal realism, but mainly the latter. Not that
the call to public judicial deliberations was dominant or even existent,
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but the call to full disclosure was. It came in the form of an attack
on the rhetoric of judicial opinions.
The legal realists proved for once and for always that opinions
written in what Llewellyn called the formal style-as opposed to the
grand style-were not logically or scientifically credible: many were
incredible. They may have proved that such credibility in judicial
opinions was not even possible. It may indeed be that the most credible
form of presentation would be spontaneous expression seriatim by each
participating judge. Conceivably that form could serve the influence-
stating function, while something like the present form of opinions
would serve the law-stating function-the expression of rules, princi-
ples, and policies and their legislative implication.
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee at all that public delibera-
tion alone would serve the goals suggested and implied in the Miller-
Sastri proposal, simply because there is no assurance that the total
deliberation would be purely public or that the public ponderance
would be sincerely deliberative. A judge can easily be publicly legal-
istic. The pathological legalist cannot help himself. The insincere
dialectician will fall back on legalistic pretense primarily because
one significant power function of legalistic rhetoric is to camouflage
and mislead, to steer the audience away from the true or proper
grounds of decision.
Legalistic rhetoric is propagandistic in its public displays, inhibit-
ing and self-deceptive in its use in private explorations and introspec-
tions. That is why Jerome Frank recommended that all judges undergo
psychoanalysis. He had confronted himself in that way, but not even
he came consistently close to candor in his opinions. Conceivably he
would have if his colleagues had shared his views on decision making.
How far we would have to go in our thinking about law to write or to
submit opinions displaying the candor which the facts of life but not
the law justify! Certainly the majority of the judges which populate
our highest court or the other -high courts are not going to accept
such suggestions. Many of them simply cannot be reached because of
the barriers which legalistic attitudes about law allow or encourage
them to maintain. Given the trends in legal education, some future
generation of high court judges will be more amenable to such sug-
gestions. Of course, there is no guarantee that those trends will
continue.
In the meantime, if the Supreme Court is just another policy-
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making body, and perhaps the "least dangerous" and most tender one
at that, there seems to be no good reason to pick open its gut before
the real decisional dynamics of other policymaking bodies are ex-
posed. The call must rest on another base: the potential for abuse
of the kind of power that lies in trust, "the fidelity of law." The cru-
cial issue becomes: is there some way to bring the special brand of
policy making and implementation which is judicial to the fore with-
out destroying its public credibility. The Warren Court was testing
the limits, the Burger-Nixon Court threatens to drop behind a mask
which is discredited only in some sophisticated and maybe in all
alienated pockets of society.
The call to public deliberation could serve a desirable base for
public education if it were poured into mass media channels. At the
same time, interested scholars and researchers could pursue some
presently untapped questions vital to the crucial issue. Just what are
the expectations concerning courts in this society? How is law in gen-
eral viewed in its ideal image? What is the assumed function of
courts? Is the function of the Supreme Court viewed distinctively?
What part does the mass media play in affecting these image-expecta-
tions? We might even discover that the public is ready after all. Imagine
the possibilities of a judicial initiation of restoration of full public
faith in government.
At another level of inquiry, experiments can be devised to help
assess the difference it might make if judicial deliberations were pub-
lic. Law schools provide most useful laboratories for new kinds of
"moot courts." There are further possibilities. My impression is that
there would be intermediate appellate courts that might be willing
to join in the experiments; not to allow bugging, but perhaps a
trusted observer, maybe even to try public deliberations. Maybe ex-
periment in judicial conference could be motivated. Certainly there
is more hope at that level for starters.
Public judicial deliberations cannot be forced, but unnecessary
secrecy can be undermined. The proposal is necessary and well timed
at least as a challenge. If neutrality is possible in response, the tradi-
tions of science obviously are better fitted to the task than either juris-
prudential or political theory alone. Not just any science will do; but
science duly sensitized to the significance of linguistic and communica-
tive dynamics is of prime importance in understanding judicial be-
havior and public response.
